This is an unpopular opinion, and I get why – people crave a scapegoat. CrowdStrike undeniably pushed a faulty update demanding a low-level fix (booting into recovery). However, this incident lays bare the fragility of corporate IT, particularly for companies entrusted with vast amounts of sensitive personal information.

Robust disaster recovery plans, including automated processes to remotely reboot and remediate thousands of machines, aren’t revolutionary. They’re basic hygiene, especially when considering the potential consequences of a breach. Yet, this incident highlights a systemic failure across many organizations. While CrowdStrike erred, the real culprit is a culture of shortcuts and misplaced priorities within corporate IT.

Too often, companies throw millions at vendor contracts, lured by flashy promises and neglecting the due diligence necessary to ensure those solutions truly fit their needs. This is exacerbated by a corporate culture where CEOs, vice presidents, and managers are often more easily swayed by vendor kickbacks, gifts, and lavish trips than by investing in innovative ideas with measurable outcomes.

This misguided approach not only results in bloated IT budgets but also leaves companies vulnerable to precisely the kind of disruptions caused by the CrowdStrike incident. When decision-makers prioritize personal gain over the long-term health and security of their IT infrastructure, it’s ultimately the customers and their data that suffer.

  • r00ty@kbin.life
    link
    fedilink
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    4 months ago

    Thanks. That explains a lot of what I didn’t think was right regarding the almost simultaneous failures.

    I don’t write kernel code at all for a living. But, I do understand the rationale behind it, and it seems to me this doesn’t fit that expectation. Now, it’s a lot of hypothetical. But if I were writing this software, any processing of these files would happen in userspace. This would mean that any rejection of bad/badly formatted data, or indeed if it managed to crash the processor it would just be an app crash.

    The general rule I’ve always heard is that you want to keep the minimum required work in the kernel code. So I think processing/rejection should have been happening in userspace (and perhaps even using code written in a higher level language with better memory protections etc) and then a parsed and validated set of data would be passed to the kernel code for actioning.

    But, I admit I’m observing from the outside, and it could be nothing like this. But, on the face of it, it does seem to me like they were processing too much in the kernel code.