• Dem Bosain@midwest.social
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    2 months ago

    Why is Signal almost universally defended whenever another security flaw is discovered? They’re not secure, they don’t address security issues, and their business model is unsustainable in the long term.

    But, but, if you have malware “you have bigger problems”. But, but, an attacker would have to have “physical access” to exploit this. Wow, such bullshit. Do some of you people really understand what you’re posting?

    But, but, “windows is compromised right out of the box”. Yes…and?

    But, but, “Signal doesn’t claim to be secure”. Fuck off, yes they do.

    But, but, “just use disk encryption”. Just…no…WTF?

    Anybody using Signal for secure messaging is misguided. Any on of your recipients could be using the desktop app and there’s no way to know unless they tell you. On top of that, all messages filter through Signal’s servers, adding a single-point-of-failure to everything. Take away the servers, no more Signal.

    • Zak@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      0
      ·
      2 months ago

      If someone can read my Signal keys on my desktop, they can also:

      • Replace my Signal app with a maliciously modified version
      • Install a program that sends the contents of my desktop notifications (likely including Signal messages) somewhere
      • Install a keylogger
      • Run a program that captures screenshots when certain conditions are met
      • [a long list of other malware things]

      Signal should change this because it would add a little friction to a certain type of attack, but a messaging app designed for ease of use and mainstream acceptance cannot provide a lot of protection against an attacker who has already gained the ability to run arbitrary code on your user account.

      • douglasg14b@lemmy.world
        link
        fedilink
        arrow-up
        0
        ·
        edit-2
        2 months ago

        Not necessarily.

        https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model

        If you read anything, at least read this link to self correct.


        This is a common area where non-security professionals out themselves as not actually being such: The broken/fallacy reasoning about security risk management. Generally the same “Dismissive security by way of ignorance” premises.

        It’s fundamentally the same as “safety” (Think OSHA and CSB) The same thought processes, the same risk models, the same risk factors…etc

        And similarly the same negligence towards filling in holes in your “swiss cheese model”.

        “Oh that can’t happen because that would mean x,y,z would have to happen and those are even worse”

        “Oh that’s not possible because A happening means C would have to happen first, so we don’t need to consider this is a risk”

        …etc

        The same logic you’re using is the same logic that the industry has decades of evidence showing how wrong it is.

        Decades of evidence indicating that you are wrong, you know infinitely less than you think you do, and you most definitely are not capable of exhaustively enumerating all influencing factors. No one is. It’s beyond arrogant for anyone to think that they could 🤦🤦 🤦

        Thus, most risks are considered valid risks (this doesn’t necessarily mean they are all mitigatable though). Each risk is a hole in your model. And each hole is in itself at a unique risk of lining up with other holes, and developing into an actual safety or security incident.

        In this case

        • signal was alerted to this over 6 years ago
        • the framework they use for the desktop app already has built-in features for this problem.
          • this is a common problem with common solutions that are industry-wide.
        • someone has already made a pull request to enable the electron safe storage API. And signal has ignored it.

        Thus this is just straight up negligence on their part.

        There’s not really much in the way of good excuses here. We’re talking about a run of the mill problem that has baked in solutions in most major frameworks including the one signal uses.

        https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/api/safe-storage

  • x1gma@lemmy.world
    link
    fedilink
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    edit-2
    2 months ago

    How in the fuck are people actually defending signal for this, and with stupid arguments such as windows is compromised out of the box?

    You. Don’t. Store. Secrets. In. Plaintext.

    There is no circumstance where an app should store its secrets in plaintext, and there is no secret which should be stored in plaintext. Especially since this is not some random dudes random project, but a messenger claiming to be secure.

    Edit: “If you got malware then this is a problem anyway and not only for signal” - no, because if secure means to store secrets are used, than they are encrypted or not easily accessible to the malware, and require way more resources to obtain. In this case, someone would only need to start a process on your machine. No further exploits, no malicious signatures, no privilege escalations.

    “you need device access to exploit this” - There is no exploiting, just reading a file.

    • refalo@programming.dev
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      0
      ·
      edit-2
      2 months ago

      How in the fuck are people actually defending signal for this

      Probably because Android (at least) already uses file-based encryption, and the files stored by apps are not readable by other apps anyways.

      And if people had to type in a password every time they started the app, they just wouldn’t use it.

    • lemmyvore@feddit.nl
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      0
      ·
      2 months ago

      You. Don’t. Store. Secrets. In. Plaintext.

      SSH stores the secret keys in plaintext too. In a home dir accessible only by the owning user.

      I won’t speak about Windows but on Linux and other Unix systems the presumption is that if your home dir is compromised you’re fucked anyway. Effort should be spent on actually protecting access to the home personal files not on security theater.

  • Borna Punda@lemmy.zip
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    edit-2
    2 months ago

    The backlash is extremely idiotic. The only two options are to store it in plaintext or to have the user enter the decryption key every time they open it. They opted for the more user-friendly option, and that is perfectly okay.

    If you are worried about an outsider extracting it from your computer, then just use full disk encryption. If you are worried about malware, they can just keylog you when you enter the decryption key anyways.

    • x1gma@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      0
      ·
      2 months ago

      The third option is to use the native secret vault. MacOS has its Keychain, Windows has DPAPI, Linux has has non-standardized options available depending on your distro and setup.

      Full disk encryption does not help you against data exfil, it only helps if an attacker gains physical access to your drive without your decryption key (e.g. stolen device or attempt to access it without your presence).

      Even assuming that your device is compromised by an attacker, using safer storage mechanisms at least gives you time to react to the attack.

  • HappyTimeHarry@lemm.ee
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    2 months ago

    That applies to pretty much all desktop apps, your browser profile can be copied to get access to all your already logged in cookie sessions for example.

    • douglasg14b@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      0
      ·
      edit-2
      2 months ago

      And there are ways to mitigate this attack (essentially the same as a AiTM or pass-the-cookie attacks, so look those up). Thus rendering your argument invalid.

      Just because “something else might be insecure”, doesn’t in any way imply “everything else should also be insecure as well”.

  • Prethoryn Overmind@lemmy.world
    link
    fedilink
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    2 months ago

    Ah yes, another prime example that demonstrates that Lemmy is no different than Reddit. Everyone thinks they are a professional online.

    Nothing sensitive should ever lack encryption especially in the hands of a third party company managing your data claiming you are safe and your privacy is protected.

    No one is invincible and it’s okay to criticize the apps we hold to high regards. If your are pissed people are shitting on Signal you should be pissed Signal gave people a reason to shit on them.

  • thayer@lemmy.ca
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    0
    ·
    edit-2
    2 months ago

    While it would certainly be nice to see this addressed, I don’t recall Signal ever claiming their desktop app provided encryption at rest. I would also think that anyone worried about that level of privacy would be using disappearing messages and/or regularly wiping their history.

    That said, this is just one of the many reasons why whole disk encryption should be the default for all mainstream operating systems today, and why per-app permissions and storage are increasingly important too.